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Abstract
A deeply-rooted preference for sons may decrease the relative
number of female births. Though there are variables that may
help to erode the couple’s preference for sons, these same vari-
ables may also increase the availability of means to ensure male
births. This is the case of educational achievements. It is not
difficult to assume, for example, that a higher level of educa-
tion helps to erode the couple’s preference for sons. However,
the effect of an increase in education on female disadvantage at
birth is not so straightforward. More education may increase the
couple’s awareness of the possibility of using prenatal sex detec-
tion. We discuss the issue throughout the paper by developing
an empirical framework for the case of India.
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1 Introduction.
A growing body of literature brings to light the issue of gender bias in
mortality. By estimating the additional number of females of all ages that
would be alive in the absence of gender inequality - and naming them the
‘missing women’ - Amartya Sen (1990) calculates the cumulative impact
of gender bias in mortality. In this way he shows how an alarmingly high
number of women are missing as a consequence of gender inequality. As an
example, the missing women number over 100 million in South Asia, West
Asia, and North Africa (see Coale, 1991; Klasen and Wink, 2003, for some
refinements in these calculations).
Moreover, in a large part of the world, the number of missing women is
increasing dramatically. This situation is clearly illustrated by the downward
trend in their sex ratio - the number of females divided by the number of
males -. Studies of this downward trend have been carried out for several
different countries, such as India (see Bhat, 2002a, 2002b; Dyson and Moore,
1983; Mukerjee, 1976), China (see Junhong, 2001), Korea (see Kim, 2005),
Bangladesh (see D’Sourza and Chen, 1980).
This paper is focuses on the case of India, and on the ‘sex ratio at birth
(SRB)’. In India, the sex ratio of the total population has been steadily
decreasing since the last century, as reported in the appendix (figure 1).
This is also the case of the sex ratio of the child population. We refer to
Mukherjee (1976) for an analysis of the downward trend of the first part
of the century. The trend from 1961 to 2001 is displayed in the appendix
(figure 2). All the results shown in the appendix are calculated from the
provisional 2001 census of India (Government of India, 2001).
A deep-rooted preference for males is thought to be the main reason
for gender bias in the sex ratio, and the sex ratio at birth in particular
(see Ben-Porath and Welch, 1976; Kim, 2005). Hence, the paper begins by
presenting, in section 2, the issue of the process by which parents develop
their preferences with respect to the sex of their unborn children. The
assumptions of the preference formation process are tested in section three
using data from the 1991 Census of India at district level (Government of
India, 1991, 1997, 1998, 2003). The last section presents the conclusions.
2 Preferences and autonomy.
Before exploring the effects of preference for sons, we consider the notion
of ‘autonomy to prefer’. This is seen as a person’s ability to develop the
same values that she would develop in a context where freedoms are fully
guaranteed. A couple may develop a preference for sons due to a historic
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background of female disadvantage. These people are hardly able to attach
the same value to every human life, as would be the case in an alternative
context of equality. People unconsciously suppress certain potential values.
The notion of autonomy to prefer - although connected - differs from that
of ‘autonomy to act’. Autonomy to act is related to a person’s fulfilment of
her preferences. This notion is very close to the general notion of ‘freedom of
choice’ (see Pattanaik and Xu, 1990, and literature following their seminal
work). People’s achievements do not fully match their preferences when
they lack the instruments that would enable them to act in accordance. A
couple with a preference for sons may not satisfy this preference (may have
a daughter) if the technology that would enable them to ensure the sex of
their future child is unavailable. Given an expansion of their freedom of
choice, the couple would ensure the sex of their child. In other words, the
couple may gain in their autonomy to act without experiencing any variation
in their autonomy to prefer.
In a context of substantial gender differences in the autonomy to act,
virtually everybody is restricted in their autonomy to prefer. A growing
body of literature supports that autonomy to prefer is restricted to those who
suffer disadvantage. In order to avoid suffering from the inability to fulfil a
desire, people may unintentionally suppress it. Elster (1982) uses Aesop’s
well-known fable to illustrate the mental adaptation of humans (the process
known as ‘adaptive preference formation’). That is, when the fox realises
it is unable to reach the bunch of ripe grapes; it tells itself that they are
sour. Nussbaum (2000) illustrates the case of women’s mental adaptation in
contexts of gender inequality. In her words, a woman suffering disadvantage
may lose “the concept of herself as a person with rights”(Nussbaum 2000:
113).
At the same time, the context of extreme gender inequality (of action)
may also constrain autonomy to prefer for those who take advantage of
inequality. People are more likely to develop a preference for sons in this kind
of context that in contexts where freedoms are fully guaranteed. Koopmans
(1964) and Kreps (1979) put forward the idea of preference for flexibility.
That is, when people’s present choices affect their future options, they prefer
whatever current options will extend the set of future options. A child’s sex
plays a significant role in defining the family’s future options in a context of
inequality (see Dyson and Moore, 1983; Srinivasan, 2005).
There are kinship structures (dowry system, women moving away from
their parents’ home at marriage) in which the daughters of the family entail
a higher future cost than sons do. The dowry system, for example, consists
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of the payment of revenue by families in order to have their daughters (not
their sons) married. If they have to pay a dowry, an already poor family may
be pushed into dire poverty. Although this kinship structure is now illegal
in India, dowry practices continue to survive. In a recent study of India,
Srinivasan (2005) highlights the importance of dowry practices in defining
the family’s future options. Hence, the presence of a very deeply rooted
preference for males is a plausible assumption in our case study.
2.1 Effects of preference for sons.
A deeply rooted preference for males is thought as one of the main reasons
for gender bias in mortality. Certainly, it is difficult to accept that parents
deliberately act against their daughters. This perspective is maintained by
the Government of India (1981), among other authors. They insist on there
being “little evidence to support the view that there is a deliberate neglect
of female babies despite the fact that there may be a preference for male
children”.
On the other hand, there exists evidence to show that sons are better
provided for in the distribution of scarce resources than daughters are, at
least in dire living conditions (see Murthi, Guio and Dre`ze, 1995; Rosenzweig
and Schultz, 1982; Sen and Sengupta, 1983). Sen and Sengupta (1983), for
example, find that the enhancement of general living conditions barely en-
larges the capabilities of girls in times of disaster. They set their framework
in two villages in West Bengal. These villages were selected because one of
them had undergone land reform, while the other had not. Land property
tends to be decentralised after reform, which leads to the enhancement of
average family living conditions. After conducting a nutritional survey on
children up to five, they conclude the following: while malnutrition is high
in both villages, it is in fact higher in the one that has not undergone land
reform. Moreover, it is also the case that improvements in child nutrition
patterns are associated with higher gender inequality. While general im-
provements enhance nutrition patterns in boys, they hardly do so at all in
the case of girls.
Another context in which to examine the (possible) satisfaction of the
preference for sons is at birth. In societies in which sex selection is not
practised, the distribution of SRB is relatively constant for the country as
a whole. This was the assumption reached in some general studies on de-
mographic outcomes, such as Becker (1960) and Trivers and Willard (1973).
Later on, advances in prenatal sex determination transformed the scenario.
The expansion of prenatal sex determination now enables families to choose
the sex of their new child by practising abortion when the foetus is not of the
desired sex. When sex preferences matter, some biases arise in the reported
SRB, as in the case of India.
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Instead of a relatively constant overall distribution of SRB, certain pat-
terns emerge. The estimated SRB in areas of north-west India is lower than
in the rest of India, as illustrated by the maps that appear in the appendix
(figures 3 and 4). Maps in figures 3 and 4 correspond to urban and rural
areas, respectively. Data from the 1991 Census of India are used in the
estimates.
Although the 1991 Census of India does not provide SRB data at district
level, it is possible to calculate it from the data actually released. The Gov-
ernment of India (1991), in the Primary Census Abstract (PCA) for 1991,
supplies the available data for the population aged 0-6 by gender. Further-
more, the Government of India (1997) uses data from the 1991 census to
estimate child mortality by gender at different ages. Estimates are based on
the South Asian model life and modified via the Brass procedure. Partially
guided by that report, we estimate SRB using a reverse survival technique.
Similar estimates of sex ratio at birth are provided in Bhat (2002b) and
Sudha and Irudaya Rajan (1998). Our calculations are displayed in the
appendix (Calculations 1).
All in all, comparing figures 3 and 4, the basic patterns are largely
similar. They portray higher female disadvantage for districts in North-
west India, which is consistent with earlier studies. For example, Dyson
and Moore (1983) identifies northern and western districts (in Gujarat, Hy-
machal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab and
Haryana) as registering high gender bias in mortality.
At the same time, we notice that fewer women are born in urban areas
than in rural ones. Certainly, urban areas currently have better access to
modern medical techniques. Since Sudha and Rajan (1998) documented an
expansion in the availability and use of prenatal sex determination and abor-
tion technology in rural areas, the patterns in rural areas may be strength-
ened. This would occur under continuing extreme gender inequality, and
hence, persistent preference for sons. In any case, the existence of patterns
showing bias in mortality at birth makes us aware that son preference exists
and put into practice.
In the next section we develop an empirical framework where we test the
relationship between gender differences in terms of autonomy to act and bias
in SRB. As discussed, it is expected that preference for sons is very deeply
rooted in those districts where gender differences in autonomy to act are
greater. Hence, we will hardly be surprised to find a negative relationship
between the degree of inequality (in terms of autonomy to act) and the
number of female births (conditional to the number of male births).
At the same time, we test to see how enlarging autonomy to act affects
bias in SRB. In this case, the increment in autonomy to act is expected to
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decrease SRB in those districts where there is a very deeply rooted prefer-
ence for sons. However, we expect the opposite effect from an increment
in autonomy to prefer. An increment in autonomy to prefer is expected to
erode preference for sons and then increase SRB.
3 An empirical framework.
Proceeding with this research, we now test the relationship between inequal-
ity in terms of autonomy to act and gender bias in mortality. At the risk
of oversimplifying the issue, and for identification purposes, we assume this
relationship to be linear. For modelling purposes, first consider the following
notation,
i the district,
SRBi the number of female births divided by the number of male
births in i,
Xi the vector of variables describing gender differences in auton-
omy to act in i,
Yi the vector of variables capturing the degree in autonomy to
act in i.
Then, we specify the relationships among variables by using a linear
regression model as follows,
SRBi = β0 + Xiβ1 + Yiβ2 + i (1)
where i is the random disturbance.
Throughout the section we estimate the coefficients of the regression.
Moreover, we regress two versions of the econometric model displayed in
equation 1, one a reduced model, the other an extended model. In the re-
duced form, a measure of gender differences in access to ‘independent income
opportunities (IIOD)’ is used as proxy for gender differences in autonomy to
act. In this model, an ‘index of the wealth of the region (W)’ is also added
as proxy for district-varying explanatory features capturing autonomy to
act. Indeed, wealth helps individuals to match desires and achievements.
Formally, the reduced model is written as:
SRBi = β
′
0 + β
′
1IIODi + β
′
2Wi + 
′
i (2)
The extended model also accounts for the effect of ‘educational achieve-
ments (E)’ in the district, for the effect of variables referred to the ‘presence
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of scheduled castes (SC)’, and for the effect of access to ‘medical services
(MS)’. Formally,
The extended model is written as:
SRBi = β
′′
0 + β
′′
1 IIODi + β
′′
2 Wi + β
′′
3 Ei + β
′′
4 SCi + β
′′
5 MSi + 
′′
i (3)
Medical services are used as proxy for services that could enable people to
use sex-selective abortion technology, while the presence of scheduled castes
indicates the proportion of people with higher access to such facilities. More
comments are required for the role of education on explaining bias in SRB.
The role of education in explaining bias in SRB requires further comment,
because education captures not only a person’s degree of autonomy to prefer,
but also her autonomy to act.
On the one hand, education increases a person’s autonomy to act. The
Planning Commission for India (in the introduction of the 10th Five-Year
Plan 2002-2007) highlights the importance of education to raise awareness
of opportunities. It is recognised that the lack of education among poor
people constitutes one of the main obstacles to their making use of income
growth, for example. In the same way, lack of education may be a major
impediment preventing individuals from making use of, say, sex-selective
abortion technology.
On the other hand, education increases a person’s degree of autonomy
to prefer. Education provides individuals with human skills needed for in-
dependence of mind, such as reasoning and judging. It is worth noting that
a large body of literature provides evidence to support the fact that incre-
ments in education erode preference for males. To give an example, Bhat
and Zavier (2003) infer that education reduces son preference after estimat-
ing a multivariate regression model based on data from the Indian National
Family Health Survey. The theory that daughters receive a greater share
of household resources when women’s opportunities are greater also finds
support in the empirical results of Murthi et al. (1995).
Hence, the effect captured by parameter β
′′
3 accounts for the effect of
education on autonomy to act - and autonomy to act on SRB - and for
the effect of education on autonomy to prefer - and autonomy to prefer on
SRB. Once again, there are powerful reasons to believe that these two effects
work in opposite directions. While an increment in autonomy to prefer is
expected to erode preference for sons and then increase SRB, an increment
of autonomy to act is expected to decrease SRB in the presence of preference
for sons.
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All in all, as noted earlier, the key issue of identification concerns the
relationship between gender differences in terms of autonomy to act and
gender bias in SRB. The relationship is captured by parameter β1 in equation
1. This is done by parameters β
′
1 and β
′′
1 in equations 2 and 3, respectively.
The positive sign of the parameter identifies a negative relationship between
the degree of gender differences in autonomy to act and the number of female
births (conditional to the number of male births).
3.1 Data set and sample
The data set at district level is compiled from reports based on Indian Cen-
suses, and referred to year 1991 (Government of India 1991, 1998, 2003).
This releases information of educational achievements, labour opportuni-
ties, and other specific information about availability of resources in the
districts (such as access to medical services) or other demographic features
(such as the distribution of social groups).
At the same time, we focus on a sample of 333 districts for which the
required information is available. Some features of the sample are listed in
what follows. According to demographic studies, the expected SRB is about
950 female births per 1.000 male births (see Johansson and Nygren, 1991;
Visaria 1971, among others). In 173 out of the 333 districts in the sample,
the SRB takes values below .950. Furthermore, one hundred districts take
values below .935. That is, a large number of the districts in the sample
display gender bias in their reported SRB.
As far as the features of the population in the sample are concerned, 28
percent of the whole population are reported as having independent income
opportunities, 89 percent of them are males. Regarding the educational
achievements, education is extended to sixty percent of the population.
Males account for sixty percent of educated people. Furthermore, in all
of the districts, both the number of educated males to the total of male
population and the number of males having independent income opportuni-
ties to the total of male population surpass the corresponding numbers for
females.
3.2 Definition of the variables
As already noted, our dependent variable - the SRB - is estimated using a
reverse survival technique based on the South Asian model life and mod-
ified via the Brass procedure. Calculations are made from the 1991 data
(Government of India 1991, 1997). Our calculations are displayed in the
appendix (Calculations 1).
The index for gender differences in access to independent income oppor-
tunities is defined by the difference between the ratio of female main workers
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to the total female population minus the same ratio for males. The calcula-
tions are based on data from Government of India (1991). Main workers are
defined in the census as those engaged in paid employment for a minimum
of 183 days a year. Unpaid employment, such as slavery, is not considered
to be main work. Hence, the main worker variable can be considered an
adequate approximation of independent income opportunities.
In order to capture district wealth, we use the wealth index, defined
on the interval [0,1], and drawn from Government of India (2003). Their
calculations are based on the data from the 50th round of National Sample
Survey Organisation’s survey on household expenditure and income. Our
main reason for using this wealth index is that, as far as we are aware, for
1991 at least, the Government of India has released no standard index data,
such as GDP, at the district level.
As far as educational achievements are concerned, we focus on literacy
standards. For societies with universal literacy, education is better repre-
sented by an elaborated educational index, such as the measure of progress
toward universal primary education. As noted earlier, however, this is the
case of our sample. Therefore, the literacy rate is an adequate proxy for
educational achievements in our case study. Furthermore, literacy rates are
calculated as the ratio of literate population to the total population. The
calculations are based on data from Government of India (1991), where a
person is assumed to be literate if she is aged seven years or more and can
both read and write with understanding in any language.
In the case of other districts level data, it is worth noting the following.
The ratio of the scheduled castes to the total population is compiled from
Government of India (1991), where no-one professing a religion other than
Hinduism, Sikhism or Buddhism is deemed to belong to scheduled castes.
Regarding access to medical services, data on the proportion of villages with
some form of medical facility is compiled from Government of India (1998).
Basic statistics of these variables are displayed in the appendix (table 1).
3.3 Econometric methodology
The estimation of the parameters in the reduced and extended models (equa-
tion 2 and equation 3) raises some econometric issues. The Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) method provides efficient estimates of parameters when dis-
turbances are normally distributed. The normality assumption is violated,
however, because no relationship among variables is captured in the course
of the regression. In our study case, there are reasons to suspect that gen-
der bias in mortality is strongly associated with geographical location. On
earlier maps, geographically adjacent values tend to be similar.
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There are several different procedures to cope with spatial correlation
bias. One of them consists in introducing dummy variables for each State.
Such a model is estimated by the OLS method. When the model includes
a large dummy variable set, an alternative method is to define a categorical
variable and estimate the model by a fixed-effects method. We estimate the
reduced and extended models using State as the categorical method. The
OLS and fixed-effects estimates are displayed in the appendix (table 2).
At the same time, spatial dependence can also be captured by including a
variable created by combining the SRB vector and a geographic connectivity
matrix. Elements of the matrix capture spatial dependence among districts.
The variable is named ‘spatially lagged SRB (SLSRB)’ throughout the pa-
per because its corresponding parameter in the ordinary regression captures
spatially-lagged SRB (see Berik and Bilginsoy, 2005). Following this proce-
dure, the OLS estimates of the reduced and extended models are displayed
in the appendix (table 2, columns 3 and 6).
Violation of the normality assumption may also be due to heteroskedas-
ticity. Disturbances are heteroskedastic when they have different variances.
To check disturbances for heteroskedasticity, we apply White’s general test,
the results of which are shown in the appendix (table 2). The hypothesis of
homoskedasticity cannot be rejected on the basis of these results.
Before estimating the parameters of the regression model, the sample
is checked for outliers by applying Hadi’s method to measure the distance
from each observation to a cluster of points. This identifies Nellore, one
of the districts in Andhara Pradesh, as the only outlier. Removal of this
district from our sample does not alter the parameter values, though their
significance is strengthened. At the same time, for a more complete test of
robustness, we compare the coefficients of the reduced and extended models.
This comparison yields no variation in the sign and significance of the key
parameters. Furthermore, there is no statistical variation in the dimension
of the parameters. Hence, our results can be considered robust.
3.4 Main econometric results.
As formerly noted, we are interested in estimating the sign of the relationship
between autonomy to act and gender bias in SRB, identified by parameter
β1. We refer comments to parameter β1, rather than to parameters β
′
1
and β
′′
1 separately, because there are no statistical differences between their
estimates. Furthermore, there are no statistical differences in sign, size and
significance between OLS estimates and fixed-effect estimates.
All the estimates of parameter parameter β1 are significantly different
from zero, taking values that are above zero. The result shows a negative
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relationship between gender inequality (in terms of autonomy to act) and
the number of female births (conditional to the number of male births).
In particular, preference for sons appears to be strengthened by gender in-
equality in autonomy to act. Fewer female births occur in areas with scarcer
independent income opportunities for females. Our result is consistent with
studies on the relationship between females’ labour opportunities and child
survival bias (see Berik and Bilginsoy, 2005; Rosenzweig and Schultz, 1982,
among others).
At the same time, we examine the effect of the degree of autonomy to
act in an attempt to explain bias in the SRB. Inter district variations in
autonomy to act across districts are captured in the model by variables such
as district wealth. The negative value of estimates capturing the effect of
wealth in explaining bias in SRB reveals a negative relationship between
wealth and the number of female births. The result is corroborated in the
extended model.
As far as education concerns, it is worth noting the following. The
estimates shows a negative relationship between educational achievements
and SRB. The result evidences that the decline in female births due to
awareness of new technology is greater than the increment in female births
caused by a weakening of son preference. This strengthens our belief of
there being a very deep-rooted preference for sons, which counteracts the
(possible) positive effect of education on female survival.
An additional point of interest is the study of the effect of the enhance-
ment of mothers’ living conditions, especially as far as maternal health is
concerned. Improvements in maternal health not only reduce maternal
mortality, but also reduce the probability of an additional child dying at
birth. Human Geography generally assumes that the probability of death at
birth is higher in males than in females, therefore improvements in maternal
health may raise the proportion of male births (see Bhat, 2002b; Trivers and
Willard, 1973, among others). This may be used to justify the reduction
in the SRB. However, it is hardly possible that (in the absence of gender
bias at birth) increased maternal health brings SRB below 950 female births
(per 1,000 male births). This is in fact the commonly accepted ratio in the
absence of female disadvantage (see Visaria, 1971).
Finally, geography is fundamental as evidenced by the statistical signifi-
cance of the parameters associated with the regional dummy variables. The
close relationship among districts within the same State may conceivably
be due to cultural features and factors relating to the expansion of rights
(see Dyson and Moore, 1983). However, data to capture these features at
district level are not available at present.
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4 A remark.
Throughout the paper, we examine the effect of preference for sons on the re-
lation of female births to male births. We prove that increasing women’s op-
portunities (conditional to men’s opportunities) increases the relative num-
ber of female births. Furthermore, we guess that female disadvantage will
decrease as people gain more autonomy to prefer. Analysis of the central
issue of autonomy to prefer will be facilitated by the availability of gender-
desegregated data on the guarantee of entitlement over resources and rights,
for instance. At present, we can only test our hypothesis against the expe-
rience of those regions of the world where raising a son or a daughter makes
little difference to the family’s future options. It is quite interesting to note
that, currently, more girls (per 1.000 boys) are born in those regions of the
world where a child’s sex is not a strong determinant of the family’s future
options than in those societies where it has a determining effect.
References
[1] Becker, Gary S. 1960. An Economic Analysis of Fertility. Reprinted in The
Economic Approach to Human Behavior, Gary S. Becker. 1976. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press.
[2] Berik, Gu¨nseli, and Cihan Bilginsoy. 2000. ‘Type of Work Matters: Women’s
Labor Force Participation and the Child Sex Ratio in Turkey.’ World Devel-
opment 28(5): 861-78.
[3] Bhat, Mari P.N. 2002a. ‘On the Trail of Missing Indian Females. I: Search for
Clues.’ Economic and Political Weekly 21: 5105-18.
[4] Bhat, Mari P.N. 2002b. ‘On the Trail of Missing Indian Females. II: Illusion
and Reality.’ Economic and Political Weekly 21: 5244-63.
[5] Bhat, Mari P.N., and Francis AJ Zavier. 2003. ‘Fertility Decline and Gender
Bias in Northern India.’ Demography. 40(4): 637-57.
[6] Ben-Porath, Yoram, and Finis Welch. 1976. ‘Do Sex Preferences Really Mat-
ter?’ Quarterly Journal of Economics 90(May): 285-321.
[7] Coale, Ansley J. 1991. ‘Excess Female Mortality and the Balance of the Sexes in
the Population: an Estimate of the Number of ‘Missing Females’.’ Population
and Development Review 17: 517-23.
[8] D’Sourza, Stan, and Lincoln C. Chen. 1980. ‘Sex Differences in Mortality in
Rural Bangladesh.’ Population and Development Review 6: 257-20.
[9] Dyson, Tim, and Mick Moore. 1983. ‘On Kinship Structure, Female Autonomy,
and Demographic Behavior in India.’ Population and Development Review 9:
35-60.
[10] Elster, John. 1982. ‘Sour Grapes-Utilitarianism and the Genesis of Wants.
In Utilitarianism and beyond, eds. Amartya K. Sen, and Bernard Williams.
London: Cambridge University Press.
12
[11] Government of India. 1981. ‘Provisional Population Totals of 1981.’ 1981 India
Census (Series 1, India, Paper N. 1). New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General
of India.
[12] Government of India. 1991. ‘Primary Census Abstract (PCA) of 1991.’ 1991
India Census (District Level). New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General.
[13] Government of India. 1997. ‘District Level Estimates of Fertility and Child
Mortality for 1991 and their Interrelations with Other Variables.’ 1991 India
Census (Occasional Paper N. 1 of 1997). New Delhi: Office of the Registrar
General.
[14] Government of India. 1998. ‘Availability of Infrastructural Facilities in Rural
Areas of India: An Analysis of Village Directory Data.’ 1991 India Census.
New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General.
[15] Government of India. 2001. ‘Provisional Population Totals.’ 2001 India Cen-
sus (Series 1, India, Paper N. 1 of 2001). New Delhi: Office of the Registrar
General.
[16] Government of India. 2003. ‘Report of the Task Force: Identification of Dis-
tricts for Wage and Self Employment Programmes.’ New Delhi: Planning Com-
mission of India.
[17] Johansson, Sten, and Ola Nygren. 1991. ‘The Missing Girls of China - A New
Demographic Account.’ Population and Development Review 17: 35-51.
[18] Junhong, Chu. 2001. ‘Prenatal Sex Determination and Sex-Selective Abortion
in Rural Central China Population and Development Review 27: 259-81.
[19] Kim, Jinyoung. 2005. ‘Sex Selection and Fertility in a Dynamic Model of Con-
ception and Abortion.’ Journal of Population Economics 18: 41-67.
[20] Klasen, Stephan, and Claudia Wink. 2003. ‘Missing Women: Revisiting the
Debate.’ Feminist Economics 9: 263-99.
[21] Koopmans, Tjalling C. 1964. ‘On Flexibility of Future Preference.’ In Human
Judgments and Optimality, eds., Maynard W. Shelley, and Glenn L. Bryans.
New York John Wiley and Sons Inc.
[22] Kreps, David M. 1979. ‘A Representation Theorem for ‘Preference for Flexi-
bility’.’ Econometrica 47: 565-78.
[23] Mukherjee, Sudhansu B. 1976. ‘The Age Distribution of the Indian Population.
A Reconstruction for the States and Territories, 1881-1961.’ Honolulu: East-
West Population Institute.
[24] Murthi, Murthi, Anne C. Guio, and Jean Dre`ze. 1995. ‘Mortality, Fertility and
Gender Bias in India: A District-Level Analysis.’ Population and Development
Review 21.
[25] Nussbaum, Martha C. 2000. Women and Human Development: the Capabili-
ties Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[26] Pattanaik, Prasantta K, and Yongsheng Xu. 1990. ‘On Ranking Opportunity
Sets in Terms of Freedom of Choice.’ Recherches Economiques de Louvain 56:
383-90.
13
[27] Rosenzweig, Mark, and Paul T. Schultz. 1982. ‘Market Opportunities Genetic
Endowments and Intrafamily Resource Distribution: Child Survival in Rural
India.’ American Economic Review 72(4):803-15.
[28] Sen, Amartya K. 1990. ‘More than 100 Million Women are Missing.’ The New
York Review of Books 20 (December).
[29] Sen, Amartya K., Sunil Sengupta. 1983. ‘Malnutrition of Rural Children and
the Sex Bias.’ Economic and Political Weekly 19 (annual number).
[30] Srinivasan, Sharada. 2004. ‘Daughters or Dowries? The Changing Nature of
Dowry Practices in South India.’ World Development 33(4):593-615.
[31] Sudha, Shreeniwas, and S Irudaya Rajan. 1998. ‘Intensifying Masculinity of
Sex Ratios in India: New Evidence 1981-1991.’ Thiruvananthapuram: Centre
for Development Studies.
[32] Trivers, Robert L., and Dan E. Willard. 1973. ‘Natural Selection of Parental
Ability to Vary the Sex Ratio of Offspring.’ Science 179(4068): 90-92.
[33] Visaria, Pravin. 1971. ‘The Sex Ratio of the Population of India.’ 1971 India
Census (Paper N. 10). Delhi: Manager of Publications.
14
Appendix.
Table.1. Basic statistics.
Variables Mean Min Max
Sex Rate at Birth (SRB) .944 .826 1.05
(females/males)
Differences in terms of -.392 -.523 -.244
Independent Income Opportunities (IIOD)
(females minus males)
Wealth (W) .518 0 1
Educational Achievements (E) 1.155 .669 1.699
Scheduled Castes (SC) .123 .024 .322
Medical Services (MS) .393 .035 1
Spatially Lagged Sex Rate at Birth (SRB) .942 .868 .985
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Table.2. Basic Results of a Cross-section Analysis of the De-
terminants of Sex Rate at Birth (SRB) in Urban Indian Districts
(1991).
Independent
Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
————– ————– ————– ————– ————– ————–
IIPD .079 .079 .051 .085 .085 .058
(.029)** (.029)** (.021)* (.030)** (.030)** (.021)**
W -.019 -.019 -.012 -.020 -.020 -.012
(.007)** (.007)** (.005)* (.007)** (.007)** (.005)*
E -.018 -.018 -.009
(.009)* (.009)* (.005)
SC -.059 -.059 -.056
(.027)* (.027)* (.023)*
MS -.013 -.013 -.003
(.006)* (.006)* (.003)
constant .921 .985 1.000 .964 .997 .173
(.013)** (.011)** (.059) (.022)** (.015)** (.066)**
SLSRB .923 .868
(.058)** (.064)**
F-test(P-value) .0000 .0008 .0000 .0000 .0003 .0000
White(P-value) .915 .49 .996 .98
R sq .57 .57 .56 .59 .59 .58
Sample size 333 333 333 333 333 333
Notes:
1: SRB reduced model estimated by OLS method.
2: SRB reduced model estimated by fix effect method.
3: SRB reduced model estimated by OLS method.
4: SRB extended model estimated by OLS method.
5: SRB extended model estimated by fix effect method.
6: SRB extended model estimated by OLS method.
1 and 4: Includes country dummies, but not reported. Almost all of them are statis-
tically significant at .01 level.
Robust standard errors in brackets.
**Significant at .01 percent level. * Significant at .05 percent level.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1.: Sex Ratio of total population is calculated as the ratio of female
population to male population.
Figure 2.: Sex Ratio of total population is calculated as the ratio of female
population to male population. Sex Ratio of child population is calculated
as the ratio of female population in age group 0-6 to male population in age
group 0-6.
Figure 3.: Values are labeled as follows: Female Advantage if values of
estimated SRB are higher than 950 female born per 1,000 male born; and
Female Disadvantage if values are lower than this. Beyond this, we consider
Female Advantage to be high if this figure is above 970 and Female Disad-
vantage to be high if the figure is below 935. Values for the divisions come
from Visaria (1971)’s study of the common values assumed in demographic
studies.
Figure 4.: Values are labelled as follows: Female Advantage if values of
estimated SRB are higher than 950 female born per 1,000 male born; and
Female Disadvantage if values are lower than this. Beyond this, we consider
Female Advantage to be high if this figure is above 970 and Female Disad-
vantage to be high if the figure is below 935. Values for the divisions come
from Visaria (1971)’s study of the common values assumed in demographic
studies.
17
Figure 1.:
Source: Government of India (2001).
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Figure 2.:
Source: Government of India (2001).
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Figure 3.: Estimated Female Disadvantage at Birth, (Urban),
1991 1
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Source: Own elaboration from the data given in the PCA of 1991 Census of India.
1Values are labelled as follows: Female Advantage if values of estimated SRB are higher
than 950 female born per 1,000 male born; and Female Disadvantage if values are lower
than this. Beyond this, we consider Female Advantage to be high if this figure is above
970 and Female Disadvantage to be high if the figure is below 935. Values for the divisions
come from Visaria (1971)’s study of the common values assumed in demographic studies.
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Figure 4.: Estimated Female Disadvantage at Birth, (Rural),
19912
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Source: Own elaboration from the data given in the PCA of 1991 Census of India.
2See figure 2 for an explanation of the value labels.
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Calculations 1
First, consider the next notation and definitions,
Fi the total of female survivors to recorded female births i years
ago,
Mi denotes total male survivors to recorded male births i years
ago,
q
f
k the probability of dying from birth to the age k for females
and, hence, qfk+1 is the probability of dying from birth to the end
of the considered period,
qmk this probability for males,
Bf the annual average of female births,
Bm the same average for males,
Definition 1:
The SR of child population in the age group (0-6), denoted SR(0-6), is
given by,
SR(0− 6) =
F0 + F1 + F2 + F3 + F4 + F5 + F6
M0 + M1 + M2 + M3 + M4 + M5 + M6
(4)
The ratio is based on the fact that population in the 0-6 age-group are the
survivors from the births recorded during the current and the last six years.
Definition 2:
The SR at birth, denoted SRB, is given by,
SRB =
Bf
Bm
(5)
This is the number of recorded female births divided by the number of
recorded male births.
Our calculations to estimate the SRB from data released by Government
of India (1991) are derived as follows. The survivors of female births recorded
i years ago are expressed as,
Fi = B
f
−Bfq
f
i+1 = B
f (1− qfi+1) (6)
In the same way, the survivors of male births recorded i years ago are
given by,
Mi = B
m
−Bmqmi+1 = B
m(1− qmi+1) (7)
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Then, the sex ratio of equation 1 can be expressed as a sum of the
survivors of the births recorded during the current and the last six years.
Formally,
SR(0− 6) =
Bf [(7−
∑i=6
i=0 q
f
i+1)]
Bm[(7−
∑i=6
i=0 q
m
i+1)]
(8)
From equations (2) and (5), we obtain the estimator of SRB as,
ŜRB = SR(0− 6)
7 −
∑i=6
i=0 q
m
i+1
7 −
∑i=6
i=0 q
f
i+1
(9)
For the calculations it is worth noting the next. The Government of
India (1997) only releases q1, q2, q3, q5, separately for females and males.
For simplicity, we assume that mortality ratios are the same at ages three
and four and at ages five, six and seven. However, alternative interpolations
offer similar results.
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